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Abstract:  
On 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Yemen with the aim to restore the 
rule of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and destroy the Houthi movement. Scholars and 
policy analysts moved quickly to examine the Yemen war as a by-product of Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry in the region and a sectarian struggle. These traditional explanations fall short of 
unravelling the Saudi motive behind launching a large-scale operation in Yemen, a severely 
weakened and politically divided neighbour. This paper offers an alternative explanation of 
abrupt Saudi aggressiveness toward Yemen. It argues that this intervention is driven by a 
non-material need; Saudi leadership aims to assert the Kingdom’s status as a regional 
power in the Middle East.  
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Introduction 
On 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on Yemen with the aim to 
restore the rule of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and eliminate the Houthi 
movement. Located at the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the southern entrance of the Red 
Sea, Yemen has always constituted a cornerstone of Saudi foreign policy. Since the 
Kingdom’s foundation in 1932, the Saud family (Al Saud) has strived to expand its 
control to its southern neighbor and prevent it from threatening its interests. In 
1934, the first modern war broke out between the two Arabian states. The 1934 
Treaty of Ta’if put an end to this military confrontation, ceded the three provinces of 
Asir, Najran and Jizan to the army of Ibn Saud, and established a peaceful 
coexistence between the two countries.2 Since then, the Saudis have avoided 
confrontation and, instead, maintained precarious stability in Yemen through 
meddling in internal politics, backing local groups against others, using Yemeni 
guest workers as leverage, buying off tribal leaders, and conducting limited, 
occasional military operations, especially over border disputes.  
Operation Decisive Storm, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen that began in 
March 2015 constituted a break with this decades-long peaceful coexistence. 
Although Saudi Arabia had spent substantial resources on military procurement and 
training over the last two decades—especially after the 1991 Gulf War—3never 
before had the Saudi Kingdom, or any of the Gulf states, so proactively and 
aggressively deployed their military forces or engage in a large, offensive mission as 
the operation in Yemen. The intervention in Yemen has unveiled a new era in Saudi 
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foreign policy and appears to overshadow Gulf politics for years to come. This paper 
attempts to explain this abrupt aggressiveness in Saudi policies toward Yemen 
while situating it in a more comprehensive understanding of the Kingdom’s foreign 
policy in the region as an emerging regional power fighting for its status.  
Saudi Arabia’s motivation in the Yemen offensive arguably reflects a Kingdom 
that is starting to rely on its own resources in fighting for and assert its status as a 
leading power in the region. Scholars, commentaries in the Arab media, and 
government officials have often characterized the war in Yemen as part of a larger 
struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran over influence in the Middle East. From this 
perspective, the war is the reaction to the influence of Iran expanding in the Arabian 
Peninsula through the rebel Houthi movement.4 A proxy war with Iran, along a 
Sunni-Shiite divide, became central tropes in Saudi state-owned media. Meanwhile, 
other scholars and commentaries focus on personalities at the expense of more 
structural factors. In particular, the ascendancy of King Salman al Saud in January 
2015 to power, and the parallel rise of his ambitious son, Prince Mohamed bin 
Salman, to a minister of defense, are often considered at the origin of this 
intervention.5 Many scholars explore the evolution in the decision-making process 
in the Saudi Kingdom that followed the  passing of King Abdullah and attributed the 
Yemen War to centralization of the decision in the office of the crown prince.6 
Despite the importance of individual decision-makers, the preparation for the 
operation in Yemen has started since the Houthi take over Sana’a in September 
2014, which preceded Salman’s reign by several months.7 
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This paper offers an alternative explanation of the Saudi intervention in 
Yemen and argues that this aggression is driven by a non-material need, that is a 
will for status. In the post-2011 order, the Kingdom has fought for its status as a 
regional power at both regional and international levels. In this context, the Saudi 
leadership responded to regime change in Yemen with a violent intervention to 
confirm its status as a leading power in the region. The paper starts with an 
overview of the Yemen crisis while outlining the current developments in the war. 
The second section explores the drivers of the Saudi intervention in Yemen; it 
argues that this aggressive strategy can be considered as a status-seeking behavior 
and contextualizes this explanation within the International Relations literature. 
The last section presents an assessment of the overall performance of Saudi forces 
in the war and, furthermore, draws out the implications of the intervention on the 
Yemen crisis and its ramifications on the evolving role of the Saudi Kingdom in the 
Middle East. 
The Road to Yemen 
Yemeni politics is complex and often plagued with shifting alliances at domestic and 
regional levels. Saudi Arabia has historically seen Yemen as a source of threat, and 
its stability is inextricably connected to the security of the Arabian Peninsula. 
Whether the threat is real or imagined, the Saudi Kingdom employed several 
measures to control politics in Yemen. Mainly, it has relied on Ali Abdallah Saleh, 
president of North Yemen from 1978 and later of a unified Yemen from 1990 until 
2012, to maintain stability. Fears of Yemen's instability peaked with the appearance 
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of Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), a movement headed by the Houthi family, in the 
mid-2000s. The movement emerged as a result of economic and social grievances in 
northern Yemen, especially in the governorate of Saada.8 The movement has 
challenged the authority of the central government in Yemen since the mid-2000s 
and started an active rebellion in northern Yemen against the government of Ali 
Abdallah Saleh.9 In 2009, Saudi Arabia openly entered the fighting against the 
Houthi movement and launched a military operation on its southern border — the 
first Saudi unilateral operation in decades.10 This operation was far from successful. 
The Saudi armed forces failed to incur a defeat on or even weaken the Houthi rebels, 
which questioned the military effectiveness of the Saudi armed forces despite its 
vast technological superiority.11  
The current crisis began during the 2011 Arab uprisings. The story of the 
uprisings in Yemen was not different from that in Tunisia or Egypt. The diffusion of 
protests against authoritarian regimes across the Arab world reinvigorated Yemen’s 
marginalized social movements and united different geographical and political 
factions in Yemen, such as the northern Houthi movement and the southern 
secessionist movement Hiraak.12 In 2011, the mass-based revolutionary movements 
demonstrated against the regime of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh and 
demanded both political and economic reforms. The Houthis and their main party-
militia found in the uprisings a new outlet for their discontent against the central 
government.13 They dropped their weapons and joined the peaceful protests.14  
The Yemeni uprisings, like most other uprisings in the Arab region, did not 
succeed in consolidating a genuine democratic transition due to the lacks of reforms 
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and the interference of regional actors.15 The Saudi Kingdom, along with other Gulf 
monarchies, swiftly designed a transitional plan for the country to ensure that Saleh 
is replaced with a friendly government. The Saudis negotiated the ousting of Ali 
Abdullah Saleh and supported the vice-President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, in a 
one-man election. Following this flawed political transition, Yemen has descended 
into a conflict between different groups, pushing the country to the edge of a civil 
war.16 Four years after the uprisings, in September 2014, the Houthis took military 
control of the capital Sana’a and the state collapsed into power centers. Yemeni 
security forces became divided between two camps. The first is loyal to Hadi, who 
still finds support in the south. The second is loyal to Saleh, who allied with the 
Houthis from the north. The picture is further complicated by the presence of other 
groups who benefited from this divide to expand their influence in Yemen, namely 
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well as a Yemeni affiliate of the Islamic 
State.17 
In January 2015, President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi resigned. The collapse of 
the government led to the outbreak of violence between the two opposing camps. At 
the end of February, Hadi fled Sanaa to Aden and announced it as his new capital. On 
22 March 2015, the Houthis marched to Aden, seized the international airport, and 
bombed Hadi’s headquarters. When the Houthis started their assault on Aden, Hadi 
fled the country to exile and called for external intervention. Within days, the 
Houthis expanded to the South, took Taiz—the country’s third-largest city—and 
seized al-Anad, where the US military base was located. On 25 March 2015, Saudi 
Arabia unilaterally launched an attack on Yemen under the name “Operation 
 7 
Decisive Storm,” with the announced aim to restore the legitimate government of 
Hadi and to prevent the Houthis and their allies from taking control of the country. 
Hours later, eight Arab states—Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, Jordan, Sudan, and Morocco—announced their backing to the Saudi 
intervention, what can be conceived as the largest coalition of autocrats. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France have also backed the coalition providing 
diplomatic and logistic support. 
The Kingdom officially announced that the goal of its intervention was 
“defending the legitimate government in Yemen” and “saving Yemeni people from 
the Houthi aggression.” During the 26th Arab League Summit in Sharm al-Sheikh 
(28-29 March 2015), King Salman vowed: “the campaign will continue until it 
achieves its goals for the Yemeni people to enjoy security.”18 Another narrative 
evolved quickly as the primary rationale behind the Saudi decision—that of a war 
between the Kingdom and the so-described Iran-backed Houthis, who belong to a 
Shiite sect. In this context, Saudi-owned media and religious authorities quickly 
portrayed Yemen as a battlefield for the Saudis to fight the Shiites, perceived as a 
threat not only to Yemen but the entire region.19 King Salman accused the Houthis of 
being backed by Iran and of causing sectarian division in Yemen.20 In other words, 
the Kingdom attempted to portray its interventions in Yemen at the center of a 
Sunni regional effort to counter the threat of Iran and the expansion of Shiism in the 
Gulf. Scholars and analysts quickly picked this line of argument to portray the 
conflict in Yemen as a struggle between the Saudi Kingdom and Iran, where 
divisions within Islam mark the fault lines of conflict.21 
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Describing the Yemen war as a proxy conflict along sectarian lines is 
erroneous and misleading. First, the Iranian role in Yemen has been exaggerated 
and even deliberately distorted by the Saudis to legitimize their military 
intervention. No evidence points to any Iranian involvement in Yemen before 2014, 
and the Houthis has evolved as a genuinely rebellious movement that cuts across 
sectarian lines. The Houthi movement is a tribal group that is rooted in Yemeni 
political context, and the group’s decisions and political goals are rooted in its local 
Yemeni leadership.22 In fact, Iran does not enjoy any command over their decisions 
or actions. US intelligence officers disclosed information that further casts doubt on 
the claims that the Houthis are a proxy group fighting the Kingdom on behalf of 
Iran.23 For example, Iranian representatives warned the Houthi rebels from taking 
the capital Sana’a, but the Houthis ignored this advice and took over the city in 
September 2014. 24  
In contrast, some evidence suggests that Iran’s links to the Houthis might have 
increased at the end of 2014.25 Yet, this evidence remains suggestive at best. The UN 
Panel of experts on Yemen have stated in January 2017 that there was “no sufficient 
evidence to confirm any direct large-scale supply of arms from the government of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran”.26 Also, it important to note that the Houthis have 
received military support from their most important ally, the former President 
Saleh, whose army was equipped with US weapons.  The UN Panel also reported that 
almost 68 percent of stockpile of the Yemeni military was lost during the war, some 
of which was destroyed but significant weapons remain under the control of the 
Houthis.27 Hence, the alliance with Ali Abdullah Saleh was far more significant for 
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the Houthis than the alliance with Iran. In other words, the crisis in Yemen is more 
complex than a mere proxy struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Instead, the 
crisis is rooted in domestic political grievances and social inequalities. As Kendall 
succinctly states, “with or without Iran’s involvement, the underlying structure of 
the conflict would likely be the same”.28 
The political struggle in Yemen is more complex than a mere sectarian binary. 
It is true that many members of the Houthi movement belong to the Zaydi sect, a 
branch of Shiism. Nevertheless, it is wrong to assume that the Yemen crisis is driven 
by primordial identities.29 Zaydism is distinct from the “Twelver Shiism” found in 
Iran both in doctrine and practice. In fact, the theological difference between both 
Zaydi and Twelver Shiism leaves the Zaydis closer to Sunni Islam. The Zaydis 
present themselves as a separate sect distinct from both Shiism and Sunnism. It is 
also worth noting that Saleh’s supporters from the Yemeni army fighting with the 
Houthis are Sunnis.  
Paradoxically, the Houthis were previously Saudi Arabia’s ally. In the context 
of the Arab Cold War, which dominated the region in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
struggle in Yemen became a truly proxy war between Egypt supporting the Republic 
and the Saudi Kingdom supporting the monarchy.30 In 1962, a group of Yemeni 
officers staged a coup d’e tat in Sanaa and overthrew the monarchy to establish a 
republic. The ousted monarch Imam Muhammad al-Badr retreated to the north of 
Yemen where he became supported by the Zaydi tribes—the same tribes from 
which the Houthi movement emerged in the 1990s. Following the Egyptian 
intervention in Yemen to support the coup d’e tat, the Saudi Kingdom provided the 
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Zaydi forces, which were allied with al-Badr, with weapons and support. After the 
war, the Saudis marginalized the Houthis. Since the 1980s, the Saudis launched 
campaigns to spread Wahhabism in Yemen. Against this marginalization and the 
despotism of Saleh, the Houthi movement evolved into an insurgency against the 
regime in Sana’a.  
It is in this context that the recent crisis in Yemen can be viewed as a civil war 
between groups in a political struggle, and the image of a Sunni-Shiite proxy war in 
Yemen is only a distorted narrative presented by the Saudi Kingdom to legitimize its 
aggression on Yemen. Furthermore, this sectarian narrative fails to account for 
decades of oppressive patrimonial rule in Yemen, persistent inequalities, and 
economic dependence. Similarly, the notion that the Houthis are Iranian pawns 
ignores the groups’ marginalization and its participation in the uprisings. This 
narrative further downplays the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and 
Saudi Arabia in particular, in hindering the transition, which led to the outbreak of 
the civil war. Finally, these narrative ignores the crucial step in the outburst of this 
violent conflict that is the destructive, full-scale military operation led by the Saudi 
Kingdom. The following section aims to transcend these sectarian accounts and 
offers an alternative explanations of the war as a struggle for status. 
Saudi Struggle for Status in Yemen 
Scholarship on interventions has tended to focus on structural, material 
explanations. Most realist theories share the assumption that states seek survival in 
an anarchic international system that produces external threats, such as shifts in the 
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relative power distribution, alignments, and the balance of power. From this 
perspective, the decision to intervene or not is based on a rational cost-benefit 
analysis.31 Other strands in the scholarship on interventions focus on domestic 
characteristics and leaders’ causal beliefs.32  
In contrast to predominant realist explanations of war, some scholars argue 
that symbolic, non-material motives—status in particular—are crucial in explaining 
states’ recourse to armed strategies, including military interventions. Lebow 
provides one of the strongest arguments in this vein, “honor and prestige were even 
more important than wealth and security”.33 He further argues that symbolic 
dimensions have been the driving motives for 62 percent of wars since 1648.34 
These symbolic factors can better explain momentous shifts in foreign policy 
decision than conventional readings that emphasize strategic calculations. Max 
Weber argues that states accumulate military power to acquire power prestige 
(Machtprestige), defined as “the glory of power over other communities.”35 As 
Morgenthau defines prestige as “the reputation for power,” he claims that states can 
go to war to “impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually 
possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it 
possesses.”36  
Along these lines, this paper argues that the Al Saud’s decision to go to war in 
Yemen in 2015 finds its origins in a struggle to assert the Kingdom's status as a 
regional power in the Middle East. Status in international relations is a standing or 
rank in a community. Status has several meanings—position, perceptual, and 
social.37 Status also denotes identity, such as “status a major power” or “status as a 
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regional power.”38 Actors, operating in a social system, acquire an identity that 
includes a definition of who they are and where they stand in relations to others. 
Status has an intersubjective nature; as actors develop a narrative of their self and 
their rank within the community, they expect others to share a similar belief about 
their status. In this sense, actors are in constant negotiation with their surrounding 
social structure.  
Status concerns often emerge when states develop a certain expectation about 
how much status they deserve, and they are accorded a lower status than their 
expectation. As status usually confers influence, actors can perceive such mismatch 
as a threat to their material ambitions. When status concerns are triggered, states 
attempt to shift their position in a hierarchy. In the case of a failure to change the 
current hierarchy, states resort to conflict and violence.39 This initiation of a 
violence military conflict is usually considered to be a ‘status-altering’ event to 
compel the international community to change their beliefs about the actor’s 
standing in the hierarchy. 
For decades, the Saudi Kingdom has relied on its religious status as the 
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and on its oil wealth to promote its pan-Islamic 
identity narrative and its regional status as the leader of the Sunni and Muslim 
worlds.40 The post-2011 order has provided the Kingdom with the opportunity to 
actively assert its status as a regional power able to shape outcomes in its 
neighborhood. No Arab country is capable of achieving the status of a dominant or 
sole regional leadership; Egypt became focused on its domestic problems and Syria 
fell into a civil war. The Saudi intervention in Yemen followed a gradual escalation in 
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the use of armed forces.41 The Saudi military intervention in March 2011 in Bahrain 
to help suppress the demonstrations as well as the indirect support for the coup 
against the Muslim Brotherhood and the restoration of a military regime in Egypt 
gave the Saudis confidence in asserting their status as a regional power.42 
Nevertheless, regional and international actors did not support the claimed Saudi 
status. As the Saudis became status conscious, they felt treated far below their 
“appropriate” status from both regional and international actors. I argue that this 
status mismatch is at the origin of what many observers qualify as a shift from a 
traditionally cautious foreign policy towards a more assertive, aggressive 
behavior.43 
The Saudis have attempted to assert their status as a leader in the GCC. This 
attempt has taken several forms. The Saudis sent troops to support its Bahraini ally, 
King Hamad Al Khalifa, against internal protests, which signaled Saudi 
determination to take the lead in protecting the Gulf from the effects of the Arab 
uprisings. Along these lines, Saudi Arabia proposed that the GCC be expanded to 
include Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt, an idea that was not welcomed by all GCC 
members. The Saudi Kingdom has constantly insisted on the institutionalization of 
an expanded, tighter, and greater union of the GCC under their command. King 
Abdullah’s proposals for greater political integration in the Gulf collapsed with 
Oman’s opposition and Kuwait’s reluctance. In December 2013, Oman opposed 
Saudi plans for a unified command structure for the armed forces of the six states. 
Kuwait refused to sign a GCC internal security pact, as it will compromise its 
political liberalism and its exceptional constitutional principles within the Gulf. The 
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emergence of Qatari-Emirati animosity over Libya and the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt made Saudi ambitions further unattainable. The most important challenge to 
the Saudi attempt of acquiring the recognition of Saudi regional status in the Gulf is 
Qatar’s foreign policy that explicitly opposed Saudi policies in Egypt and Syria, 
which led to the outbreak of the recent crisis with Qatar in 2017.44 
The Saudi claim to regional leadership received another hit as the Kingdom 
failed to build a coalition against Iran. The Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, and 
Lebanon exposed the Kingdom’s failure in acting as a regional power able to 
influence the outcome in its neighborhood. Relying on its Islamic identity, the 
Kingdom attempted to place itself at the center of a regional coalition (or in 
sectarian terms a “Sunni” coalition) to counter its long-lived Shiite enemy, Iran. All 
the GCC states except Saudi Arabia and Bahrain approved the interim nuclear 
agreement between the US and Iran in November 2013 and received Iran’s foreign 
minister. Furthermore, Oman secretly hosted the initial preliminarily deals between 
Iran and the United States, which led the nuclear talks. Turkey, which seemed a 
natural member of a “Sunni” coalition against Iran, challenged the Saudi Kingdom’s 
policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In this context, the Saudis felt 
that regional actors did not “appropriately” recognize their claim to regional 
leadership. As the Saudis have accumulated significant military capabilities over the 
decades, they felt that they were treated below their “appropriate” status.45 As 
Khalid al-Dakhil, a prominent Saudi sociologist and commentator, stated, “During 
King Abdullah, we did not have a foreign policy, and just watched events unfold in 
front of our eyes.”46  
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Furthermore, the Arab uprisings challenged not only the Kingdom’s regional 
status as the leader of Sunni Islam but also the credibility of its identity narrative. 
The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt in 2013 constituted an 
important challenge to the Kingdom’s narrative as the leader of Sunni Islam. The 
Kingdom tried to build a regional coalition against the Brotherhood by announcing 
the group as a terrorist organization and pressuring others to follow suit. However, 
many states—Qatar, Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan—explicitly refused.47 Similarly, the 
Kingdom’s quest to place itself at the center of a regional coalition to counter the 
Islamic State (IS) did not resonate in the region. 
At the international level, the Kingdom felt that its regional interests and 
ambitions were met with “disrespect,” especially from the United States. Since its 
foundation, the Kingdom has relied on external powers, first the British, then the 
United States, to ensure its security. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 
Kingdom supported Iraq in its war against the Islamic Republic in Iran. In 1990, the 
Kingdom called the United States to protect them from Saddam Hussein who 
invaded and annexed Kuwait. During the 2000s, the Saudis have pursued their 
interests in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon through proxies. Following the 2011 uprisings, 
the Saudis became convinced that the divergence between Riyadh and Washington 
has hindered the Kingdom’s regional interests. Following the US reluctance to 
intervene in Syria after accusations of chemical weapon use in 2013, the Saudi 
Kingdom has discarded its traditional defense doctrine and attempted to rely on its 
own resources for security. The Saudis perceived Obama's policies in the region not 
only as abandoning the US historical responsibilities towards preserving the 
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Kingdom’s security but also as a clear disrespect to the Kingdom’s interests.48 As the 
United States concluded the nuclear deal with Iran in 2015, the Saudis felt betrayed 
by the administration’s lack of transparency during the negotiations and that the 
Saudi needed to pursue their own interests assertively.49 In this context, the 
Kingdom urgently needed a strong reaction to assert its status in the region, and 
Yemen seemed to be the perfect target.  
The accession of King Salman to the thrown after King Abdullah’s death in 
January 2015 has been followed by significant changes in both domestic and foreign 
policymaking. King Salman appointed Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef as 
crown prince and his son Mohammed bin Salman as defense minister and deputy 
crown minister. This ascendant branch of the Saudi ruling family appears to be 
willing to compensate for what they conceive as Abdullah’s failure in acquiring the 
Kingdom’s status.50 By using its accumulated military capabilities in a war in Yemen, 
the Kingdom aims to assert its position as a regional power more effectively. 
Yemen—a weak failed state—seemed a perfect target to implement the Saudi status 
policy. In fact, the Saudi regime is now asserting a claim that any change in a friendly 
government will no longer be tolerated, thereby following the classical strategy of 
attacking the weaker to teach their opponents a lesson.  
Assessment and Implications 
Assessing the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen is a challenging task due to the lack 
of independent sources in Yemen and the opacity of the operation. That being said, a 
critical mass of sporadic information has been published in UN reports, interviews 
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of Gulf policy makers, experts reports and analyses. After a couple of years of 
incessant shelling by air, land, and sea the Saudis are learning the limits of their 
military power in Yemen. No fundamental victory can be observed as the advances 
of the Houthis, and their supporters did not cease. Until now, the intervention did 
not change the balance of power between different forces on the ground.  
The first phase of the intervention included tight air and naval blockade to 
prevent weapon supply from reaching the Houthis. This phase also included 
airstrikes to destroy Yemen’s air and costal defense and ballistic-missile capabilities. 
After destroying the initial military targets, the coalition widened its scope to 
destroy the infrastructure to hinder the Houthis’ mobility. 51 Yet, this air war had 
high costs. The collateral damage, including civilian casualties and the humanitarian 
crises, has been acute, which led to the condemnation of the intervention in 
international forums. Despite these coercive attacks against the Houthis, the 
movement showed resilience through constant ballistic missiles fired over Saudi 
borders. More recently, the Houthis have fired ballistic missiles toward Riyadh.52 
Furthermore, the ground operation in Yemen led to the exposure of the coalitions’ 
forces to attacks by the Houthis and their allies, which led to substantial losses in 
Saudi armed forces.53 
In Saudi calculations, the potential costs of the intervention are 
overshadowed by the Saudi will to gain the status of a regional power. This motive is 
manifest in daily press conferences since the beginning of the intervention held by 
the Saudi Ministry of Defense with briefings on developments in the battlefield. 
These events have become an opportunity to diffuse the image of a regional power 
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that decided to protect its interests aggressively while adding their own sense of 
status. In the first few months of the intervention, Brigadier General Ahmad Asseri 
highlights the Saudi assumedly successful strikes by photos, videos, and other 
images. These briefs have particularly focused on spreading out Saudi Arabia’s 
military capabilities—including warplanes, attack helicopters, tanks, and armored 
personnel carriers. The Kingdom has imposed a tight control over the media to 
avoid any revelation that the operation has so far failed to defeat the Houthis. 
Furthermore, the Kingdom has used a heavy hand in prohibiting any challenge to 
the official narrative of a “just” and “necessary” war. Any Saudi national who 
criticizes the war is risking significant fines and a perennial prison sentence. 
 The intervention has dangerous implications for both Yemen and the 
Kingdom. The war between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthi rebels is bringing 
Yemen to the brink. Although the Saudi intervention aimed to destroy the 
capabilities of the Houthis, it seems stirring the group’s antagonism and enmity 
towards the Kingdom rather than deterring it. The Houthis do not show any signs of 
weakening nor are they likely to give up on their resistance. Furthermore, the longer 
the war continues, the more likely the Houthis become increasingly vulnerable to 
Iranian influence out of necessity.  
Another presumably unintended implication of the war in Yemen has been the 
expansion of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) offshoots, especially in eastern 
Yemen. Amid the chaos created by the collapse of the government and the fights 
between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis, these groups found a fertile ground 
for expansion; they acquired territory and increased their influence.54 As these 
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groups have their own agenda and fight both the Saudi-led coalition and the 
Houthis, the resolution of this conflict became even more complicated. This war has 
further fragmented the country, created long-term instability, and allowed even 
extremists to thrive.  
Whereas analysts consider the expansion of these groups as the most 
dangerous development of the Saudi war in Yemen, the greatest danger to the 
Kingdom comes from the humanitarian crisis caused by the war. Since March 2015, 
the sea, air, and naval blockade over the country imposed by the coalition sparked a 
catastrophic humanitarian crisis. The airstrikes have targeted the infrastructure—
airports, roads, factories, and power stations—in a country that was already unable 
to maintain a basic infrastructure without foreign aid. The attacks also targeted 
civilians, refugee camps, schools, places of worship and residential buildings, which 
highly increased the war casualties and atrocities. Despite the announced cease in 
military actions and change of tracks toward a political process under “Operation 
Restoration Hope” on 21 April 2015, the military campaign has continued. What the 
Saudis have estimated to be a short-lived campaign seems to turn into a long war of 
attrition. According to the United Nations, from 26 March 2015 through 26 March 
2017, the war has caused more than 13,045 civilians dead, two million displaced, 18 
million in need of some humanitarian assistance.55  
The prolongation of the war and the increasing humanitarian cost risk 
undermining the Kingdom’s claim for status at the regional level. The Saudi identity 
narrative officially embraces the ideals of Islam, which prescribe solidarity and 
fraternity among Muslims and prohibit fighting or causing harm to brotherly 
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Muslim people. Although the Kingdom portrays the Houthis as Shiite Others, the 
humanitarian crisis is affecting all Yemeni population, which is constituted of a 
Sunni majority.  
*** 
Ultimately, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen is an example of pursuing a risky 
military intervention to attain status in the region. The intervention proved to be 
flawed. The cost of the operation continue to mount for the Saudi Kingdom, and 
there is still no appearing agenda to minimize the costs. Despite mounting political, 
economic, and military costs, the Saudi elite persists in this failing intervention. The 
perseverance in this catastrophic war reflects the Saudi elites’ aversion to perceived 
losses, especially in terms of status, and any attempt to solve the conflict without 
conveying the image of a Saudi victory is unlikely to succeed. 
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